M.A. Thesis:

Dividend policy and representation fees with the moderating role of board of directors' independence

A company's dividend policy can indicate whether or not the reported earnings are real or fair and provide fair business performance. In this sense, dividends are not only a sign of future profitability, but also a sign of profit quality. The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of dividend policy and board independence on agency costs. This study was conducted for a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2016 in Tehran Stock Exchange. Sample information of the studied companies after reviewing the availability of their information by software Excel was categorized and analyzed using Ivyves software. The results showed that there was a negative relationship between dividend policy and agency cost and this relationship was significant. Since agency costs reflect the agency theory and the conflict between owners and managers, so free cash flow can lead to costly representation of profit sharing and can reduce costs. Represented. Also, the independence of the Board moderates the relationship between the dividend policy and the cost of representation, and the relationship is positive and significant. Board independence, as a feature of corporate governance, makes executives less executive, thus overseeing the behavior of executives, and as a supervisory agent can influence the relationship between dividend policy. And the cost of representation has a positive effect.

Keywords: Profit Sharing Policy - Board Independence - Cost of Representation